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Abstract
Proponents of environmental policies based on liability assert that strict liability
imposed on the polluter will induce firms to handle hazardous wastes properly and to avoid
disposing them into the environment.  Economic theory and a few well-publicized cases,
however, suggest that a number of factors may dilute the incentives posed by strict liability.
In this paper, we run regressions relating unintended releases of pollution into the
environment (aggregated at the state level, and followed over nine years from 1987 to 1995)
to the imposition of strict liability on the polluter, exploiting variation across states in the
liability provisions of their mini-Superfund laws, and in the years these were adopted.
We experiment with instrumental variable estimation, fixed effects, and endogenous
switching, and find that only after we explicitly model the endogeneity of states' liability laws
is strict liability seen as reducing the seriousness of spills and releases.  We also find evidence
consistent with the notion that under strict liability, firms may spin off into, or delegate riskier
production processes to, smaller firms, which are partially sheltered from liability.  This
tendency appears to be widespread.
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Accidents Waiting to Happen:
Liability Policy and Toxic Pollution Releases
Anna Alberini and David Austin*
1.   INTRODUCTION
This paper examines whether imposing strict liability for the cost of cleaning up
contaminated sites has increased the level of care taken by firms to avoid uncontrolled
releases of pollutants into the environment, and reduced the severity of such events.
Proponents of environmental policies based on strict liability contend that, faced with
the prospect of disbursements over cleanup or to compensate third parties, firms will avoid
improper disposal of pollution into the environment.  In practice, a number of US
environmental statutes incorporate strict liability for polluters.  Under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Liability and Compensation Act (CERCLA, originally passed in
1980), parties that have contributed to badly contaminated sites may be forced to undertake
remediation, or to pay for cleanup initiated by the Environmental Protection Agency.  The full
burden of environmental costs is placed on the responsible party (the polluter) and the EPA
does not have to prove that the party failed to meet a standard of due care.  Strict liability is
often imposed on polluters by state "mini-Superfund" laws, which address the numerous non-
priority hazardous waste sites that do not qualify for the federal Superfund program, and by
the Continental Shelf Offshore Continental Shelf Act (1974), which deals with damages from
off-shore spills occurring during drilling operations.
Legal liability is one way in which firms can be made to internalize the pollution
damages associated with their production activities (Hanley et al., 1997), and is a potentially
powerful tool for addressing pollution problems (Tietenberg, 1989).  It is an ex post type of
intervention, and has the advantage of giving firms flexibility in how they wish to reduce the
likelihood of uncontrolled releases of pollutants, while relieving the government from having
to devise and prescribe safety standards, and monitor firm compliance with regulations (Boyd,
1996).
However, several factors may dilute the incentives of legal liability.  Firms with
relatively limited assets may be sheltered from the economic incentives created by strict
liability (Shavell, 1984; Tietenberg, 1989).  Firms may even select their asset level or
corporate financial structure to minimize payment of damages in the event of an accident
(Pitchford, 1995).  Ringleb and Wiggins (1990) provide evidence that imposition of strict
liability for the adverse health effects on workers exposed to carcinogens may have in fact
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encouraged wealthier firms to spin off into--or subcontract risky operations to--smaller,
judgment-proof companies in hopes of avoiding liability.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that
firms may engage in similar behaviors in response to the imposition of liability for the cost of
cleaning up contaminated sites, but we are not aware of any prior research to ascertain how
widespread this phenomenon is.1  Finally, the incentives created by liability can be altered by
the availability and cost of pollution insurance.
In this paper, we empirically explore the effects of strict liability on uncontrolled
releases of pollutants into the environment, exploiting differences across the states in the
liability structure imposed by their "mini-Superfund" programs.  These programs typically
confer authority for the regulator to force responsible parties to conduct or pay for initial
feasibility studies and remediation activities at non-priority sites, and establish financing
mechanisms to pay for such activities when the responsible party is insolvent or no longer in
existence (EPA, 1989).  As of 1995, forty-five states had passed statutes providing for
enforcement authority and funding mechanisms.
An important difference between the Federal Superfund program and many state
programs lies in the liability standards imposed on the responsible parties: Liability under the
federal Superfund is strict and joint-and-several, but this is not necessarily the case for many of
the state programs.  As of 1987, twenty-seven states had instituted strict liability; by 1995 this
number had climbed to forty.2  The remainder of the states relied on negligence-based liability.
Absent data on firms' expenditures on care, this paper uses data on accidents and spills
involving hazardous substances to establish whether the severity of these spills has been
systematically affected by the introduction of strict liability.  The spill data come from a
comprehensive database of events reported to the EPA under its Emergency Response
Notification System (ERNS).  Because ERNS was begun in 1987, we are unable to establish
how the previous passage of the federal Superfund law affected accidental releases.  Instead, we
                                               
1 A well-known example is Allied Chemical's 1973 decision to subcontract its production of the pesticide
Kepone to a small company, Life Sciences Products.  The firm was owned and run by two former Allied
Chemical employees, and was to purchase raw materials from and sell Kepone to Allied Chemical.  It was soon
discovered that both Life Sciences and Allied Chemical were illegally discharging Kepone in the James River,
and that Kepone dust covered the floor of the Life Sciences plant and contaminated its indoor air.  Air emissions
from the plant occasionally halted the traffic in the surrounding neighborhood, and irritated the skin and eyes of
the employees of a nearby ice distribution plant.  The EPA determined in 1975 that the Life Sciences plant
should be dismantled and its site decontaminated, and assessed Life Sciences a fine of $3.8 million.  The fine
was never paid, since at the time of the assessment the firm was only worth $32 (Wentz, 1989).  Boyd (1996)
cites another example of how the option of declaring bankruptcy is always available to firms.  A 1989 fish kill in
Virginia alerted state officials of widespread contamination originating from the Kim-Stan landfill.  The facility
was charged fines of $1.5 million, but filed for bankruptcy and ended up paying only $100,000.
2 States' liability structures have often changed over time.  Although the trend is towards adoption of strict
liability, a few states that had previously adopted strict liability repealed it in 1995.  Thirty-four of the states
imposing strict liability also impose joint-and-several liability. In addition, state mini-superfund laws may also
include provisions allowing private citizens (as opposed to government agencies) to file civil actions requiring
that the responsible party prevent further damage or take corrective action if citizens have been adversely affected.
In some states responsible parties must compensate those who are affected by the release of the toxic substances.
Compensation is usually limited to paying for alternative drinking water supplies or for temporary relocation.Alberini and Austin  RFF 99-29
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examine whether the strict liability feature of state cleanup programs has had any additional
influence on the severity of accidental events, above and beyond that of the federal Superfund.
Since this paper exploits the variation in liability regimes across states and over time,
this research is an example of a "natural experiment": variation in the presence and/or level of
policies across locations and time is used to test whether a policy has attained its objectives or
created perverse effects, and to estimate the magnitude of such effects.
Earlier "natural experiment" analyses have typically developed regression models
where the presence and/or level of the policy is included among the regressors.  Besley and
Case (1994) have recently questioned whether such procedures are appropriate, arguing that
the estimated coefficient of the policy variable is biased (and inference about the effects of the
policy invalid) if the policy and the outcome of interest are endogenous.
Important environmental policies that may be endogenous with their outcomes include
those addressing hazardous waste management and prevention of contamination at hazardous
waste sites.  Levinson (1997) shows that states that impose high taxes on the disposal of
hazardous waste seemingly attract large volumes of such wastes from other states--a finding
that goes against economic theory.  Once the endogenous nature of waste-end taxes is
recognized and handled through instrumental variable estimation, the coefficient of the waste-
end tax rate becomes negative and significant.  This suggests that states that have traditionally
received large amounts of hazardous waste impose high waste-end taxes in hopes of
discouraging imports of hazardous waste, and are generally attaining this goal.
By contrast, Sigman (1998) finds that states requiring the recycling and reuse of waste
oil have more numerous instances of illegal dumping of used oil.  She concludes that making
reuse of waste oil mandatory has raised its cost of disposal, encouraging "midnight dumping."
However, this empirical finding is also compatible with an alternative explanation: that states
have enacted reuse requirements because they had improper disposal problems to begin with.
Prompted by such considerations, in this paper we estimate Poisson regressions
relating the severity of chemical spills to the extent of manufacturing activity and hazardous
waste generation in the state, and the liability structure of the state's mini-Superfund program.
We develop a two stage, instrumental variable approach, motivated by a simple model of state
policy choice, to accommodate the endogeneity of the liability policy and spill outcomes.  In
our analysis, we compare our two-stage estimation results with estimates we get from a
(single-stage) regression allowing for state-specific unobserved heterogeneity, and a two-
stage model allowing for structural change across alternative liability regimes.
We find that states with more serious spills are more likely to adopt strict liability, and
this policy does afford them a reduction in spill severity over time.  We also find evidence
consistent with different behavioral responses by large and small firms, the latter being
partially sheltered from liability.
Our analysis of severe spills complements results reported by Alberini and Austin
(1998).  There it was shown that states adopting strict liability policies had higher rates of
spills and accidents, and continued to experience elevated rates--relative to other states with
similar levels and types of industrial activity--after the adoption of strict liability.  This resultAlberini and Austin  RFF 99-29
4
may have been due to behavioral differences between small and large firms.  The state's
decision to adopt strict liability was not explicitly modeled in that paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we summarize the
theoretical results about the effects of strict liability and present a simple model of state
adoption of strict liability within its hazardous waste cleanup legislation.  Section 3 presents
the econometric model and the data, and section 4 discusses the independent variables of the
econometric model.  Section 5 presents the results, and section 6 concludes.
2.   A STATE'S CHOICE OF LIABILITY STRUCTURE
State legislatures may decide between strict liability and a negligence standard in the
belief that their choice will influence the occurrence and/or severity of toxic releases.
Economic theory suggests that firms can, in most cases, be expected to respond to the
imposition of liability by changing their investment in accident prevention and safety
equipment.  The extent of this response, however, depends on firms' assets relative to their
potential liability exposure, liability regime and standards of due care, the likelihood of
prosecution by the state agency, the availability and cost of pollution insurance, and on the
existence of safety devices and technologies.
Under ideal conditions, firms held strictly liable for pollution damages will undertake
the socially efficient level of care (Shavell, 1984).3  If the harm caused by a firm exceeds its
assets, or if the firm can escape legal judgement, the level of care chosen by the firm will be
less than the efficient level.  With damages of uncertain size, however, it remains unclear
whether the level of care rises with the assets of the firm: large and wealthy firms may or may
not be safer than smaller firms (Beard, 1990).  Whether strict liability or negligence-based
liability is more effective at inducing efficient care against spills depends on how stringent the
negligence standard is (at least when the firm's assets are sufficient to pay for the damages;
Tietenberg, 1989).4
Although it will be difficult, in general, to predict the aggregate level of pollution
releases in a state, a rational state legislature should enact the liability regime that maximizes
                                               
3 Shavell (1984) assumes that a firm faces a probability p of incurring an accident resulting in damages $D.  The
amount D is known and fixed for a firm, but it may vary across firms.  The firm's precautions to reduce this
probability are a function of its expenditures e to take care: p=p(e), where  ) ( ' e p <0 and  ) (e p¢ ¢ >0.  Under strict
liability, the firm must compensate victims for the damages, which makes the firm's private expected costs (the
sum of precaution costs and expected damages) equal to social costs: e + p(e) ￿D .  The firm chooses 
* e  such
that its marginal cost is equal to the marginal benefit of care (the reduction in its expected payments to victims).
Assuming that the firm has assets sufficient to compensate victims in the event of an accident, and that it cannot
escape suit, the firm's choice of care 
* e  is also the socially optimal level of care.
4 Tietenberg (1989) shows that under negligence-based liability firms will typically adopt the court-prescribed
standard of due care, e ~
, since as long as e exceeds or is equal to the standard e ~
, the firm's sole spill-related
expense would be the cost of taking care.  The only exception is if e ~
 is greater than the expected cost incurred by
the firm under strict liability, or e
* + p(e
*
) ￿D .  In that case, the firm chooses a level of precaution equal to 
* e .Alberini and Austin  RFF 99-29
5
the net benefits of the state's hazardous waste cleanup program.5  We assume that benefits are
the reduction in expected health damages for the population exposed to accidental toxic
releases at contaminated sites where mitigation is subsequently undertaken.  Formally,
B = Dr ￿N(Z) ￿Q(E(S,A;Z);Z)￿ V(Z)   (1)
where Dr  is the mitigation-induced change in the risk of developing health problems, such as
cancer or acute symptoms, per person exposed, per unit of volume of the toxic substance.  N
is the number of exposed persons; Q is the quantity (volume) of toxic substance released; and
V is the (dollar) value of a statistical life, or the average willingness to pay to avoid the
symptoms of exposure to the toxic release.
Q should depend on the type and composition of economic activity in the state, Z,
reflecting the underlying propensity to release pollutants.  It should also depend on the
expenditure E incurred by firms to install safety equipment and monitor operations more
closely to avoid pollution releases.  E is assumed to depend on the presence of strict liability
(S; S=0,1), other liability and program attributes--here summarized into the vector A--and
firm characteristics (contained in Z).
The size of the exposed population should be influenced by residential patterns and
population density, whereas the value of a statistical life used in the state's net benefit calculus
should depend on socioeconomic characteristics and residents' tastes.  The vector Z therefore
includes variables such as income and education (see Tolley et al., 1994) along with economic
activity variables.
The costs of the program include the litigation and administrative costs of forcing
responsible parties to mitigate, plus any unrecoverable cleanup costs borne by the state.  The
state's costs are assumed to be proportional to the quantity released:
C = a(S,A;Z) ￿Q(E(S,A;Z );Z ) + p(S,A;Z) ￿c(Z) ￿Q(E(S,A;Z);Z)   (2)
where a is the average administrative and litigation cost per unit of volume of the chemical, p
denotes the fraction of all mitigation costs which the state must absorb, and c is the average
total cost of mitigation per unit of volume released.
Administrative and litigation costs, a, are likely to vary with the type of liability
adopted within the state program, as well as with the resources available to the state agency in
charge of the mini-superfund program.
By its choice of liability structure and other program attributes, the agency can
influence the probability p that the state will have to absorb unrecovered costs.  However, its
ability to control p may be affected by firm wealth: A state with a prevalence of small firms,
                                               
5 Earlier literature that has assumed and empirically tested that government agencies act rationally when
developing environmental regulations (or making cleanup decisions at Superfund sites) include Magat et al.
(1986), who examine the stringency of allowable effluent levels as per the Clean Water Act; Cropper et al.
(1992), who model the decision to cancel or register pesticides; and Gupta et al., (1996), who identify
determinants of cleanup strategies at individual Superfund sites.Alberini and Austin  RFF 99-29
6
for instance, may not find strict liability particularly useful, as such firms are more likely to
have resources insufficient to handle the full costs of cleanup at their sites.  By contrast, a
state with an abundance of larger and wealthier firms may be able to keep a(•) and p(•) low
by instituting strict and/or joint-and-several liability provisions.6  The state legislature may
also opt for strict liability if it believes it is objectively difficult for the regulator to establish a
standard of negligence, and/or to determine when it has been breached.
In our stylized model, the net benefits of the liability system are thus equal to:
BC ” (B - C) = Q(E(S,A;Z);Z) ￿[Dr ￿ N(Z) ￿ V(Z) - a(S,A;Z) - p(S,A;Z) ￿ c(Z)]. (3)
The state will select the type of liability S and other liability and program attributes, A, to
maximize the net benefits of the program, subject to a resource constraint.7  The optimal
levels of liability policy S and other program attributes A should, therefore, depend on socio-
economic characteristics Z, as should net benefits, firms' expenditure on safety, E*, and total
releases, Q*, anticipated by the state.  In this model, E* and Q* are endogenous with the
liability structure of the program.
3.   THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND THE DATA
Our theoretical model of state legislature behavior presumes that the state chooses the
liability structure to influence the precautions E taken by firms against pollution, and hence,
Q, the uncontrolled releases of pollution into the environment.  Actual releases,  ¢ Q , may or
may not be close to the level Q* anticipated by the state, depending on the accuracy of the
state's beliefs about the firms' behavioral responses and choices of E.  Do states with strict
liability have a lower level of  ¢ Q , relative to states with comparable manufacturing, mining
and population characteristics, but a different liability regime?
To answer this question, in this paper we estimate econometric equations for pollution
releases, which we measure as the severity of spills and accidents involving toxic chemicals,
expressed as the number of spill-related injuries.8  Effectively, we examine r0 ￿ ¢  Q  ￿ N  (where
0 r  is the pre-mitigation risk of acute health effects).9
                                               
6 Once such provisions are incorporated in the law, at sites where more than one party has contributed to the
releases it is in the state's best interest to target only a few parties (typically, deep-pocket firms) from which to
collect the entire amount of the damages.
7 The state's objective function can be modified to allow for pressure from interest groups resulting in different
weights being given to certain component of costs and benefits.  Alternatively, the state may consider the
resources used in abating pollution, and focus on minimizing (B-(C+E)).
8 We focus on accidental chemical spills for three reasons.  First, data on E, expenditures on safety, are not
publicly available.  Second, chemical spills have the potential of triggering the federal and state Superfund
statutes.  Third, using chemical spills avoids the problems associated with examining contaminated waste sites
recently listed on the federal or state priority lists, which may be the result of manufacturing activity many years
ago, as opposed to the response to the current liability incentives.
9 In Alberini and Austin (1998), the focus is on the frequency of releases, and spills of different chemicals are
analyzed separately.Alberini and Austin  RFF 99-29
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4. THE CHOICE OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND INSTRUMENTS
A. Determinants of Spill Severity
The vector x in equation (4) includes state socioeconomic variables thought to influence
aggregate spill rates and/or quantities released.  Descriptive statistics for all variables are
displayed in Table 1.
Table 1:   Descriptive Statistics
Label (if used
in later tables)
Description mean std. dev.
Chemical-spill injuries per state per year 13.25 53.72
number of mining establishments in the state 583.55 1091.20
number of manufacturing establishments in the state 7143.69 8456.48
number of manufacturing establishments with fewer
than 20 employees in the state
4763.28 5747.49
number of mining establishments with fewer than 20
employees in the state
466.80 912.28
EXPEND state expenditure per capita (1987 dollars) 10096.00 11701.00
ENVPROG percentage of state budget on environmental
programs
1.86 1.19
SITES suspected/actual hazardous waste sites in the state 1460.01 3821.68
LESSTHS percent of adults 25 years and older that lack high
school diploma
23.77 5.54
HIGHSCH percent of adults 25 years and older whose highest
educational attainment is completing high school
30.60 3.64
LPOPDENS Log of population density (thou. residents per sq mi) 0.43 0.08
ENVORG Number of in-state members of three major
environmental organizations, per 1000 residents
8.49 3.54
HAZWASTE quantity of hazardous waste per capita generated in
the state (thousands of lbs)
1.58 2.91
STRICT State program imposes strict liability .68 .47
CITSUIT State program allows citizen suit .31 .46
PUNDAMAG Punitive damages charged to uncooperative firms .56 .50
VICTCOMP Firms required to compensate victims of release .24 .43
CORTEFF % civil cases disposed of out of total civil cases filed 95.25 9.73
PCTDEMPR % votes for democratic candidate in most recent
presidential elections
48.04 9.14
LAWYERS Number of lawyers working on state mini-superfund
cases per million state residents
1.38 1.73
                                                
negligence-based liability; proportional v. joint-and-several liability; presence or absence of provisions
authorizing punitive damages against recalcitrant responsible parties) can be collapsed to a simple binary model
describing just the presence or absence of strict liability.  The latent variable in our probit model is the difference
between the net benefits of strict liability and those of the alternative regime.  Strict liability is adopted if this
difference is greater than zero.  The coefficients of the probit model are the difference between the as of the two
regimes in equation (5).Alberini and Austin  RFF 99-29
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The number of toxic spills and/or the quantities released should depend on the extent
of economic activity involving chemicals.  We capture this, and the distribution of industrial
activity by firm size, using numbers of production units in the industrial and extractive sectors
in the state, divided into "large" and "small" plants.  Although both economic theory and
actual examples emphasize that the incentives of liability may be diluted when firms' assets
are limited, in our empirical work we are forced to proxy for firm size using numbers of
employees to define small and large establishments.  Data on the number of firms by asset
size are not available at the state level.  In this paper, we report results obtained by defining
small establishments as those with fewer than 20 employees.14
Smaller and larger firms may contribute to pollution releases at a different rate for
various reasons.  On the one hand, firms with limited assets, sheltered from liability, have less
of an incentive to take precautions against pollution releases.  On the other hand, larger firms
or plants may use and store large amounts of chemicals or hazardous wastes, with the
potential for accidentally discharging larger quantities.15
To further capture the toxics riskiness of manufacturing processes in the state, we
include among the regressors the amount of hazardous waste generated per capita in the state.
The key regressor STRICT is a dummy indicator for whether the state mini-superfund
program prescribes strict liability in any given year.16  Figure 1 shows that many, but not all, of
the eastern states passed strict liability provisions relatively early, shortly after passage of
CERCLA.  In some states, such as New Jersey and Rhode Island, strict liability has been in place
since the late 1970s.  In the industrial Midwest, some states adopted liability relatively early
(Ohio, Missouri), others later (Michigan), and, finally, some repealed strict liability in the mid
1990s.17  Mountain states (presumably those where the mining industry is politically powerful)
generally have not adopted strict liability, but there are some exceptions (e.g., Montana).
In most cases, liability standards are subject to interpretation by the state courts, based on
the statutory language and common law arguments, advanced by the state (ELI, 1995).  States
upholding strict liability typically give enforcement authority to the state agency, making it
possible for the agency to issue unilateral orders to responsible parties, and to refer cases with
                                               
14 Although establishments with fewer than 20 employees account for only about two percent of the total value
of shipments from manufacturing firms, they are very numerous, making up about two-thirds of the total number
of establishments.  We repeated our analyses for other breakdowns into smaller and larger establishments (e.g.,
establishments with fewer and more than 50 or 100 employees), and obtained qualitatively similar results.
15 Over 95 percent of all hazardous wastes are managed on-site by the generator.  This is particularly true for
large companies, which often opt for on-site management in hopes of better monitoring operations and avoiding
involvement with faulty waste management facilities (Wentz, 1989).  In addition, OSHA requires larger
companies handling dangerous chemicals or hazardous wastes to prepare formal plans for handling emergencies,
but waives this requirement for smaller firms (Wagner, 1999).
16 Strict liability may also influence firms' perceived probabilities of being targeted by the agency.  In the absence
of strict liability, the agency may have only limited control over potentially responsible parties (EPA, 1989).
17 In the early 1990s, Ohio briefly reverted to a policy based on negligence, re-instituting strict liability in its
mini-superfund program by 1995.  Illinois repealed strict liability in 1995.Alberini and Austin  RFF 99-29
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Figure 1:  State Adoption of Strict Liability
Year of Adoption
adopted 1987 or earlier  (28)
adopted 1988-1991   (8)
adopted 1992-1995   (6)
not yet adopted   (9)Alberini and Austin  RFF 99-29
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recalcitrant responsible parties to the state general attorney.  The burden of proof is placed on the
defendant, the firm alleged to be responsible for the release.
By contrast, under negligence-based liability the burden of proof is on the plaintiff
(the state agency), which must show that the responsible party committed a negligent,
reckless, or intentionally wrongful act.  The negligence standards are established by the courts
on a case-by-case basis.  It is generally argued that under negligence-based liability the state
agency will have to spend more resources investigating the intent of parties involved at a
contaminated site, and will face a smaller universe of parties on which liability may attach.
This may lessen the incentive of firms to take care relative to strict liability (ELI, 1995).
While many responsible parties avoid litigation by reaching consent agreements with
the state agency, under either liability regime the incentives faced by firms should be
influenced by the expected outcome of litigation.  This may depend on the aggressiveness of
the state agency in prosecuting polluters; on the perceived efficiency of the state court system;
and on the perception of whether the courts tend to rule in favor of the defendant or the
plaintiff in toxic tort lawsuits.
We measure the prosecutorial aggressiveness of the state as the number of lawyers
working on state Superfund cases per million residents.  The state court efficiency is captured
by the ratio of all civil cases disposed of to all civil case filed, in any given year.18  Lacking
better statistics on state court rulings, we assume that state court preferences toward business
activity and environmental quality are similar to the state's preferences.  We proxy these
preferences with the percentage of votes for the democratic candidate in the most recent
presidential elections (PCTDEMPR), a widely used political variable.19
Additional explanatory variables include population density, and membership, per
1000 residents, in any of three major environmental organizations.  These factors may
encourage firms to avoid releases for fear that they will cause more severe damages, or will be
reported to authorities by community residents.20  However, chemical spills occurring in
densely populated areas may cause greater harm, implying that the sign of the coefficient of
population density variables is uncertain a priori.
                                               
18 Data from Court Statistics Project, National Center for Court Statistics, Williamsburg, VA.
19 These three variables--prosecutorial discretion of the state, efficiency of the state court system, political
preferences of state residents--also proxy for the expected stringency of the negligence standard established by
the state courts in states maintaining negligence-based liability.  We argue that it is such ex ante expectation that
a firm will base its choice of care on.
20 These variables also serve as controls for reporting effects across states.  As in Alberini and Austin (1998),
we think it reasonable that spills are hard to conceal in densely populated areas, and that environmentally aware
populations are more likely to report spills.  The latter effects may be partially or completely offset by firms'
tendency to take care against pollution releases in areas populated by environmentally aware residents.  Sigman
reports some evidence in the ERNS data of differences in rates of reporting oil-dumping incidents across states.
She attempts to control for reporting effects in her empirical estimations using covariates relating to reporting
effort: total non-oil ERNS incidents, average personal income, and a dummy for Democratic governor.  All are
significantly and positively related to reported oil dumpings.Alberini and Austin  RFF 99-29
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How a firm responds to the imposition of liability should depend in part on its ability
to deflect payment of some or all of the damages to its insurance companies.  Unfortunately,
data on pollution insurance purchased by firms, and claims paid to firms in relation to spills
and contaminated sites, are not available.  This forces us to omit insurance variables from the
right-hand side of the spills equation, so that the effect of pollution insurance (if any) is
absorbed into the coefficients of the included variables, to the extent that they proxy the
demand and supply for pollution insurance.  For instance, smaller firms may be unable to
either self-insure or secure insurance coverage.21 Finally, we include year dummies in our
Poisson regressions.
B.   Determinants of Liability Structure
The variables w influencing the liability policy and serving as instruments for it
include predetermined economic and political characteristics of the state.
Specifically, we proxy uncontrolled toxics with the numbers of existing hazardous
waste sites, past spills of CERCLA chemicals, and past injuries in spills of CERCLA
chemicals.  The numbers of small and large production units should capture both the toxics
risk as well as the state's likely costs in running the remediation program, and thus affect the
state's choice of liability structure.
We proxy the size of the exposed population using the state's population density.  We
also include state residents' educational attainment levels, because they are likely to affect the
public's perception of the hazardous waste problem in the state, and the value of avoiding the
illnesses associated with exposure to hazardous wastes (Tolley et al., 1994).  Absent
information about the administrative costs of the state hazardous waste programs, we assume
that a program's net benefits are influenced by the state resources available to the "mini-
Superfund" program, here measured by state expenditures per capita (drawn from annual US
statistical abstracts) and the percent of state budgets dedicated to environmental programs
(from Hall and Kerr, 1992).
Finally, the state legislature's net benefit calculus may be influenced by interest group
pressure, attitudes of residents towards environmental quality, and attitudes of the state
agencies towards the environment.  These considerations suggest that political variables, such
as the percent of popular votes for the Democratic candidate in the most recent presidential
election, be considered among the determinants of net benefits.
5. RESULTS
A. Initial Results
We begin with a brief discussion of initial Poisson models of annual chemical-spill injury
totals, reported in Table 2.  The first column presents our basic specification, in which the indicator
for strict liability is included in the right-hand side and treated as econometrically exogenous.
                                               
21 See Gastel (1998) for a discussion of pollution insurance issues.Alberini and Austin  RFF 99-29
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In the second column, (B), we add three more dummy variables describing other
features of the state mini-superfund programs.  These indicate the presence of provisions for
victim compensation in the state mini-superfund program; whether a state may impose
punitive damages if it is forced itself to initiate the cleanup; and whether the statute allows
private citizens to initiate actions against parties responsible for toxic releases lawsuits.
Table 2.  Poisson regressions.
Dependent variable: Number of injuries. (t statistics in parentheses).
All specifications include year dummies.























































































Sample size 362 362 362
Log likelihood -14064.89 -14120.17 -14726.24Alberini and Austin  RFF 99-29
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The first two variables capture additional aspects of firms' exposure to liability.  We
treat the citizen-suit provision as an effective broadening of the reach of the state environ-
mental agency, because it increases the ability of private citizens to serve as "deputies" for the
agency.  As this may permit closer oversight over firm behavior than the agency could achieve
by itself, this variable is intended to help account for a firm's probability of being targeted by
the state agency.
Treating strict liability as an exogenous regressor, we would conclude that injury totals
increase with the number of small manufacturing units but decrease with the number of large
units; that large mining operations are also associated with more severe spills; and that, as
expected, injury totals rise with population density and quantity of hazardous waste generated.
The strict liability effect is significant, predicting that, all else the same, a state with
strict liability would experience over twice as many injuries as a comparable state maintaining
negligence-based liability.  Including the other three policy variables has no effect on this
coefficient, but, interestingly, the coefficients for citizen suit and punitive damages are negative
and significant.  This could suggest that strict liability is more effective if complemented by
other measures.  The victim-compensation effect is positive here, perhaps because states that
have instituted victim compensation provisions are those that tended to experience severe
consequences from chemical spills and accidents in the first place.
Finally, the coefficients of the year dummies (not reported in the table) show that in
most years injuries are lower than their level in the first year in our data set, but they do not
seem to decline in a monotonic fashion.
Why is strict liability positively associated with the severity of chemical spills?  We
offer four possible explanations for this striking finding.
First, strict liability may have triggered behavioral responses in firms that result in less
care, and more severe accidents.  A 1987 US General Accounting Office (GAO) study reports
insurance industry assertions that "CERCLA's standards of liability…have reduced the
availability of pollution insurance" and that "[strict] liability standards undermine incentives
[of hazardous waste generators, transporters, and owners/operators of treatment storage and
disposal facilities] to exercise due care to prevent pollution, because the standard of care is
not related to the potential for liability."  This view is not unanimous, since elsewhere in the
GAO study, industry representatives are quoted as saying that "the standards of liability have
in fact increased the standard of care taken by the industry."
A second explanation is that strict liability per se is not responsible for the greater spill
severity and injuries, but is correlated with omitted factors that are.  We fitted a fixed-effect
model to see whether omitted state-specific factors drive the result.  An insignificant coefficient
of strict liability in the fixed-effects model would provide evidence in favor of this hypothesis.
The fixed-effects regression, reported in Table 2, column (C), rules out unobserved,
state-specific factors as the sole explanation for heightened injury rates in states with strict
liability.  Although likelihood ratio tests show that the fixed effects improve the fit, the strict
liability effect remains strongly significant.  Its magnitude here is much smaller than in the
pooled models of columns (A) and (B), but still implies that a strict-liability state can beAlberini and Austin  RFF 99-29
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expected to experience about 40 percent more chemical-spill injuries than a similar state with
negligence-based liability.22
In what follows, we empirically explore our two remaining explanations for the
positive association between spill severity and strict liability, namely that the strict liability
dummy may be (econometrically) endogenous with spill severity, and, finally, that riskier
industrial activities may have devolved, after the institution of strict liability, to smaller firms
that were sheltered from full liability.
The latter story recalls Ringleb and Wiggins (1990).  They find that after strict liability
was instituted for long-term health effects on workers occupationally exposed to hazardous
substances, many small firms--presumably sheltered from liability, due to their limited assets-
-were attracted into the industries with the highest potential liability.  Strict liability for
hazardous waste site cleanup may have produced a similar effect, encouraging companies to
spin off, or delegate riskier operations, to smaller firms.  In a number of well-publicized cases,
this may have indeed happened, but it is not clear how widespread this phenomenon is.
B.   Endogenous Liability
As earlier explained, we estimate a model that explicitly allows for endogeneity of
spill severity and liability laws by using a two-stage procedure.  Results for the first-stage
probit equation for states' adoption of strict liability are reported in Table 3, where the
dependent variable is the presence/absence of strict liability in state i in year t (with t ranging
from 1988 to 1995)23 and all independent variables are lagged one year.24
Table 3 shows the numbers of NPL sites and non-priority sites in the state are
positively associated with the likelihood of imposing strict liability, although the respective
coefficients are not statistically significant.  Importantly, the past frequencies of spills of
CERCLA chemicals and the past severity of such spills (the number of injuries) are positively
and strongly associated with adoption of strict liability: the data suggest that strict liability is
adopted in response to an underlying tendency to experience numerous and potentially severe
releases of pollutants into the environment.25
                                               
22 In practice, the fixed effects model allows for the endogeneity of the decision to adopt strict liability with spill
severity, as its estimated coefficients are robust to unobserved factors correlated with the state's choice of
liability regime.  These factors might include variations in the prevalence of production processes posing
particular spill risks; differences in standards of enforcement, which can influence firms' levels of care and
accident rates; and in environmental insurance practices.
23 Our probit model treats all observations as serially independent within a given state.  Alberini and Austin
(1999) fit fixed-effects logit equations, and obtain qualitatively similar results.
24 Additional lags did not improve the explanatory power of the model.
25 Past spills and chemical-spill injuries remain strong predictors of the liability policy even when the number of
NPL and non-NPL sites in the state are omitted from the equation.  When past spills and injuries are omitted, the
coefficients of the numbers of existing hazardous waste sites are positive and statistically significant.  Although
we believe that the number of existing hazardous waste sites, past spills and past spill-related injuries are all
related to the adoption of strict liability policies, the effect of hazardous waste sites is muted by collinearityAlberini and Austin  RFF 99-29
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The probit regressions results suggests that the more numerous a state's small manufac-
turing plants, and its large mining establishments, the less likely it is to adopt strict liability.
States with a preponderance of small firms may anticipate the difficulty of getting such firms to
pay for cleanup under strict liability, and may be motivated more by pollution problems arising
from their manufacturing sector than from their mining activities, in adopting strict liability.26





Log final NPL sites (lagged) 0.0946
(0.53)
Log state sites (lagged) 0.0486
(0.55)
Log spills of all CERCLA substances (lagged) 0.5050
(3.04)
Log total injuries in CERCLA spills (lagged) 0.2887
(3.35)
Log population density -0.0802
(-0.59)
Log manuf firms 20+ employees (lagged) 0.5567
(1.24)




Log mining firms 20+ employees (lagged) -1.1121
(-1.68)








Log state expenditure per capita (lagged) 0.2996
(0.89)










                                                
between these variables.  Since the purpose of this procedure is to produce fitted values for the adoption of strict
liability, we need not be too concerned with such collinearity.
26 An alternative interpretation for the negative and significant coefficient of larger mining establishments is that
the extractive industry has effectively lobbied against imposition of strict liability.Alberini and Austin  RFF 99-29
19
Similarly, the variable measuring the efficiency of the state court system now has a negative
coefficient: given the aggressiveness of the state agency, promptly functioning state courts may
imply a higher likelihood that a firm will have to pay for cleanup of its spills, encouraging the
firms to avoid pollution releases.  Neither effect, however, is statistically significant in Table 4
at conventional levels.
Table 4.  Poisson Regressions.
Dep. var.: Number of injuries. (t stats in parentheses).
Specifications (A) and (C) include year dummies.



































































































Sample size 313 255 313
Log likelihood -8084.65 -13123.95 -8179.57 (second stage)
a: Heteroskedasticity-robust t statistics.Alberini and Austin  RFF 99-29
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Results from this estimation procedure are reported in Table 4, column (C).31  A Wald
test shows that inclusion of  it M  to account for the endogeneity of the liability regime is
appropriate: the Wald statistic is equal to 5.35, which falls in the rejection region of the chi
square with one degree of freedom at the conventional significance levels.
Column (C) shows that in states with strict liability, the number of chemical-spill
injuries is unrelated to the number of larger manufacturing establishments, while increasing
with the number of small establishments.  By contrast, in states imposing negligence-based
liability, the numbers of larger manufacturing establishments is positively associated with
chemical spill injuries.  The magnitude of these coefficients suggests that in strict-liability
states, a one-percent rise (fall) in the number of small plants results in a 1.24 percent rise (fall)
in the number of injuries.  This can be contrasted with the prediction that a one-percent
change in the number of larger plants in a negligence-based state results in a 1.73 percent
change, of the same sign, in the number of injuries.  No such large-firm effect is seen in strict
liability states.
This provides support for the hypothesis that strict liability may have induced spin-
offs or delegation of risky production activities from larger to smaller firms in hopes of
avoiding liability.  Strict liability may indeed carry some perverse effects with regard to firm
behavior, and these tendencies appear to be fairly widespread.32  We conjecture that the
reason why severe spills are associated with larger plants in states maintaining negligence-
based liability may the scale to which chemicals are used in such plants.  Among other things,
the association between large plants and injuries in negligence-based liability states rules out
worker safety requirements that vary with plant size as an explanation for our findings.
Of the remaining variables, LAWYERS has a positive coefficient in both regimes, but
is significant only in the negligence-based liability regime.  It is possible that this result is due
to the endogeneity of the number of lawyers working in state mini-superfund cases and the
injury outcomes.
We had no prior expectations about the sign of the coefficient of the state court
efficiency variable.  An inefficient state court system may favor either alleged polluters or the
regulator, depending on the circumstances.  The prospect of lengthy litigation and related
expenses can act as a deterrent for certain firms, but be welcomed by others hoping to delay
cleanup activities and disbursements.  The results for the endogenous switching regression
reported in Table 4 show that in states that maintain strict liability, more efficient courts are
                                               
31 We were forced to omit some regressors from the switching regression model to ensure convergence of the
estimation routine.  Greene (1995) warns that non-convergence is a relatively common occurrence with this kind
of models.
32 The changes in the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients of the various sizes and types of plants, seen
when moving from the specification of Table 2, column (A) to that of Table 4, column (A), could then be an
artifact of structural change between the two liability regimes.  A likelihood ratio test based on the log likelihood
for the Poisson model suggests that the structural change in the coefficients from one regime to the next is indeed
significant.Alberini and Austin  RFF 99-29
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associated with more severe spills.  It is the opposite in states with negligence-based liability,
where greater court efficiency seems to deter carelessness in handling toxic chemicals.
We speculate that the difference may be driven by the possibility that firms operating
in negligence-based states are aware that the state agency will undertake litigation only when
it has a strong case against the alleged polluter.  A more efficient court system might,
therefore, be associated with an increased likelihood of ruling against the firm, all else the
same.  That the court efficiency effect is positive in strict liability states suggests that these
states are, on the whole, dominated by firms that associate lengthy litigation with increased
costs, rather than with the opportunity to delay cleanup.
The result, emerging from earlier runs, that states where the general climate towards
business is presumably less friendly--states with a greater tendency to support Democrats in
presidential elections--tend to experience, all else the same, less severe spills, is confirmed
here.  Finally, there is no detectable time trend in the severity of spills: the coefficients of the
year dummies (not reported) are for the most part insignificant.
By comparison, Alberini and Austin (1998) separately analyze spills of specific
families of CERCLA chemicals (acids, ammonia, chlorine and halogenated solvents), and
generally find that for the families with more numerous spills (acids, chlorine and ammonia),
the effects of strict liability on spill frequency are similar to those seen here for spill severity.
6.   CONCLUSIONS
We have estimated models of chemical-spill severity to see if it is influenced by state
environmental policies based on liability.  We find that the severity of unintended pollution
releases is--all else the same--reduced by imposition of strict liability.  It is clear that states
have adopted strict liability because of their tendency to experience numerous spill events,
and have managed to subsequently reduce spill events over time thanks to strict liability.
Without explicitly modeling the reasons for state use of strict liability in environmental
policies (using instrumental variable techniques), one would reach the conclusion that strict
liability has increased the frequency or seriousness of spill events.  In this sense, our results
are similar to those reported by Levinson (1997) on the effects of state waste-end taxes and
interstate shipments of hazardous waste.  Both sets of results indicate the importance of
checking for the endogeneity of environmental policies in analyses that exploit policy
differences across states.
We also find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that firms have developed
behavioral responses to avoid liability, when they are strictly liable for releases of hazardous
chemicals into the environment.  In states with strict liability, greater spill severity and
frequency are associated with smaller production units (our proxy for firms with fewer assets),
whereas this association is not present in states following negligence-based liability.  It is
possible that in a strict liability regime, firms deliberately select their corporate structures and
asset levels to avoid liability, or that small firms have tended to specialize in riskier processes.
In future research, we hope to perform individual-firm data analyses, incorporating information
about pollution insurance, to seek additional evidence to support or refute this finding.Alberini and Austin  RFF 99-29
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